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This paper examines and compares the performance and operating behavior 
of demutualized building societies (DBS) over the period of 1987-2007 
relative to mutual building societies and major retail banks in the UK.  We 
find significant differences in their operating behavior over this period and 
show that the operating behavior varies with the form of ownership. We also 
investigate the potential causes of the failure of all DBS in the UK. Our 
findings show significant changes in the funding and lending strategies of 
DBS which expose them to higher risk.  We also find a strained capital 
formation and deteriorating capital base of DBS in the post-conversion 
period. Our results suggest that changes in the business model, diminished 
capital base and, in part, failing to get all the necessary funding from the 
wholesale market at the time of the financial crisis of 2007-08 contributed to 
the demise of a once a successful financial institution in the UK. 
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Organizational Form, Business Strategies and the Demise of 
Demutualized Building Societies in the UK 
1. Introduction 
Prior literature shows that the form of ownership can have a significant influence on 
the performance of an organization, especially a financial institution. For example, 
organizations with a mutual form of ownership, where the members are the owners, 
experience lower levels of profitability than profit maximising, privately owned 
organizations (see Wilson et al. (2010), O’Hara (1981)). Fama (1980) and Fama and 
Jensen (1983) find that this could be due to the greater potential for conflict between 
managers and owners in mutual organizations over the relative importance which 
should be given to ‘social’ objectives rather than to ‘profit maximizing’ objectives.  
Other studies, however, show that mutual banks are often more efficient than privately 
owned banks because of the disciplining effect of the actions of depositors (see for 
example Saunders et al. (1990)).  
In the UK, mutual building societies have been the most important mutual financial 
institution and hold about 18 % of the total retail deposits and 22 % of the total 
outstanding residential mortgage loans (BSA (2017)). The unique feature of UK 
building societies was that initially they were established only as mutual institutions. 
This changed after the Building Societies Act 1986 which allowed mutual building 
societies to demutualize and transform themselves into the stock-form of banks. Te  of 
the 15 largest building societies demutualized between 1989 and 2000, transferring 
about 80 % of the industry’s assets to the banking sector (see Table 1). Since 2000, 
there have been no new demutualizations. This is due to the remaining mutual building 
societies establishing charitable foundations where new members, from 1997, are 
required to relinquish their rights to conversion benefits (windfall gain) to the charitable 
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foundation if the building society is converted to a company or there is a take-over of 
the building society. The absence of further conversions1 is also related to the small size 
of most of the remaining mutual building societies where a stand-alone conversion is 
not a realistic possibility. Although all British demutualized building societies were 
very large and successful while they were mutual, remarkably none of them exist today 
on a standalone basis. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The main objective of this paper is to establish why once successful building societies 
with long histories and strong brands became financially vulnerable and failed to 
survive when they converted to the stock-form of ownership. This occurred not only in 
the UK but also in the US. For example, in the US the largest demutualized savings and 
loan association, Washington Mutual, also collapsed in 2008. Much of the previous 
research concerning the demutualization of building societies in Britain has focused 
mainly on the most prominent examples of failure, notably the demise of Northern 
Rock, rather than demutualized building societies as an entire group  (see, for example, 
Eisenbeis and Kaufman (2009), Shin (2009), Marshall et al. (2011), Branston et al. 
(2009)). Klimecki and Willmott (2009, p. 120) used discursive analysis to examine 
changes in the business models of two demutualized societies, Northern Rock and 
Bradford & Bingley, ‘in the context of the neoliberal expansion of the financial sector’. 
Prior research mainly focuses on causes, motives and the process of demutualization 
(see, Stephens (2001), Tayler (2003), Martin and Turner (2000)). One particular 
objective of this paper is to examine the interplay among strategy (particularly funding 
and lending strategies), ownership form, and performance from 1987 to 2007 of mutual 
                                                 
1 In this study, ‘demutualization’ and ‘conversion’ are used interchangeably.   
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building societies, demutualized building societies, and retail banks.2 The performance 
and strategic decisions of demutualized building societies, both prior and subsequent to 
adopting the new form of ownership, are compared to, and contrasted with, building 
societies which remain mutual and with retail banks to gauge differences in their 
behaviour and any subsequent changes in their behaviour after demutualization.  
This paper extends the literature in several ways. First, this study covers the total 
population of demutualized building societies in the UK.  Second, we investigate UK 
building societies which have unique features compared to savings and loans 
associations or the insurance industry where mutual and stock firms co-exist. Third, we 
investigate whether the form of ownership has an impact on the performance and 
efficiency of demutualized building societies for which we compare their pre- and post-
demutualization performance.  In addition, we compare the performance of 
demutualised building societies with (a) building societies which remain mutual and 
(b) with major UK retail banks.3 Fourth, this study provides further evidence about the 
relationship between ownership, performance (and/or efficiency), and risk taking 
behaviour of financial institutions. Prior literature on the form of ownership and 
performance (efficiency) has produced contradictory results.  For example, O’Hara 
(1981) finds that mutual firms are less efficient than stock firms. Similarly, Erhemjamts 
and Leverty (2010) report improved operational efficiency after demutualization in 
their study of demutualised life insurers in the US between 1995 and 2004. However, 
Jeng et al. (2007) do not find improved performance after demutualization of life 
                                                 
2 Other than Abbey National, all building societies demutualized in or after 1995.   
3 It is to be noted that UK banking sector is highly concentrated and dominated by a few very large banks.  
Drake and Simper (2003) consider that market shares of UK banks are oligopolistic. Matthews et al. 
(2007) report the monopolistic competition in British banking and confirm that competition remained 
the same despite the conversion of building societies.  During the financial crisis, the term ‘Too big to 
fail’ was used for major British banks. Since the financial crisis, the UK government has introduced 
several reforms and issued new banking licences for the first time in a ce tury and several challenger 
banks are emerging in recent years (for details, see, Casu and Gall (2016)).   
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insurance firms which had demutualized before 1995. This study of the demutualization 
of UK building societies, all of which subsequently failed, therefore provides the means 
to understand these very different findings about the relationship between the form of 
ownership and performance by broadening the context from the US to the UK. Finally, 
the study sheds light on the potential reasons why once successful building societies 
failed to survive after converting to the stock-form of ownership. 
The paper offers a brief history of building societies and their demutualization in 
Section 2. Section 3 discusses the theoretical background. Sections 4 and 5 outlines 
data, variables, and research methods. Section 6 reports empirical results on the 
relationship among strategy, performance, and form of ownership for demutualized 
societies, mutual societies and banks. Section 7 provides concluding comments. 
2. UK building societies and demutualization  
Building societies originated in the UK in the late 18th century when a small group of
highly paid workers pooled their savings to buy houses for each member, after which 
their association was terminated. By the 1840s similar associations had begun to accept 
savings from a wide range of members who were not investing for the purpose of 
buying houses for themselves and by 1845 the first permanent building society was 
established. Gradually these local building societies disappeared and developed as 
regional and national organizations. Despite this growth, for over 100 years UK 
building societies retained their mutual identity while in other countries, most notably 
in the US, both mutual and stock savings and loans associations, similar to building 
societies, co-existed.   
In the US, the pace of demutualizations i creased significantly in the savings and loans 
industry in the 1980s and early 1990s. Esty (1997a, p.26) reports that by the early 1980s 
savings and loan regulators in the USwere arguing that organizational form had a major 
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impact on a firm’s performance and ‘based on these beliefs, the regulators encouraged 
mutual-to-stock conversions’. Esty (1997a, p. 60) further suggests that failing mutual 
thrifts were forced ‘to convert to stock ownership to facilitate mergers with healthy 
stock thrift’. In contrast, in the UK, when demutualization was permitted after 1986, 
only successful, profitable, and large building societies converted to the stock-form of 
ownership. These demutualizations, other than that of Bradford and Bingley, were 
initiated internally by the managers, not by government regulators as had been the case 
in the US, and approved by the members who owned the building societies.  
The UK building societies compete in the same market as banks with similar products 
and services. However, unlike the banking sector the operational flexibility of mutual 
building societies is restricted, most especially the purposes for which lending is 
permitted.4 For example, Llewellyn and Holmes (1991) report that other than the UK, 
mutual institutions in several countries have no restrictions and are free to engage in 
any banking business. This is further confirmed by Garcia-Marco and Robles-
Fernandez (2008, p. 336) where they report that in Spain commercial banks and savings 
banks, the latter operating in markets similar to UK building societies, compete in the 
same products and there is no legal restriction on their lending. These clearly show the 
distinctive features of UK building societies with comparable firms in the US and 
European countries.  
3. Theoretical background and motivation 
Extant literature offers a number of explanations as to why firms change their form of 
ownership. For example, Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that when economic 
                                                 
4 The Building Societies Act requires that at least 75 % of building society assets must be loans fully 
secured on residential property and 50 % of the funds must be raised from the individual members (retail 
depositors) of the society. Although the Butterfill Act 2007 allows the Treasury to increase the limit of 




efficiencies are to be achieved, organizational change takes place. San-Jose et al. (2014) 
find efficiency as a reason to change in the Spanish banking system. However, Cowling 
and Sugden (1998) consider that the efficiency approach is incompatible with the 
modern big corporation and offer instead a strategic decision making pproach ‘as 
important for distinguishing the essence of the modern large corporation’ (p. 59).  
Mayers and Smith (1986) discuss the possibility of expropriation in organizational 
change. Erhemjamts and Leverty (2010) investigate the US life insurance industry and 
find that operational efficiency is one of the important determinants of organizational 
change and show that it improves after demutualization. Cole and Mehran (1998, p. 
291), using a sample of demutualized US thrift institutions, also conclude that ‘after 
conversion and the expiration of ownership-structure restrictions, firm performance 
improves significantly’. They argue that restrictions harm a company’s performance 
because it prevents them from choosing an optimal structure. Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2010) also provide a similar type of explanation where they argue that 
differences in asset-mix could impact an institution.  These findings are particularly 
important for this study with the restrictions on the types of funding and lending 
permitted for UK mutual building societies.  
Another explanation for changing the form of ownership refers to risk taking behaviour. 
For example, Esty (1997b) finds that organizational form has an impact on risk-taking 
behaviour of financial institutions with stock-form institutions having more incentive 
to take risk than mutually-owned savings and loans associations. Lack of capital market 
discipline is another reason explored in the literature to explain the differences in 
operations of different forms of organizations (see Altunbas et al. (2001), Llewellyn 
and Holmes (1991)), given that mutual firms face little pressure from the market and 
are less efficient than the stock-form of banks. These aspects also highlight that UK 
9 
 
building societies are unique in their operations as compared to similar types of 
organizational forms elsewhere as well as retail banks in the UK. By examining the 
operating behaviour of demutualized building societies in comparison to those which 
retained their mutual status and retail banks, this study seeks to answer the following 
questions:  
i. What made successful financial institutions so vulnerable once they changed 
their form of ownership? 
ii.  Did demutualized societies change their funding and lending strategies and did 
this play a role in their demise?  
iii.  Does the organizational form affect investment and funding strategies? 
iv. Does the form of ownership have an impact on the performance of a firm? 
4.  Data and variables 
The sample consists of all ten demutualized building societies (DBS) in the UK that 
either floated on the London Stock Exchange or were taken over by other demutualized 
societies and retail banks. Table 1 (Panel A) shows that six of these DBS were floated 
on the stock market while the remaining four were taken over by other DBS or retail 
banks. Of the societies which floated, Woolwich was bought by Barclays plc in 2000 
and Abbey National by the Spanish bank, Santander, in 2004. One DBS, Northern 
Rock, was the first major financial institution in the UK to be brought to the brink of 
collapse, and subsequently nationalised by the British Government in February 2008. 
Another large DBS, Halifax, merged with the Bank of Scotland in 2001 to form Halifax 
Bank of Scotland (HBOS). During the financial crisis of 2007-08, HBOS was 
threatened with closure and was taken over by Lloyds TSB in January 2009. This take-
over was encouraged by the government to avoid another nationalisation and it came 
after Santander’s takeover of Bradford and Bingley (the last building society to 
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demutualize) in September 2008. Alliance and Leicester was also taken over by 
Santander at the peak of the financial crisis in late 2008.  This study also encompasses 
the ten largest building societies which remain mutual (MBS)5 and seven major UK 
retail banks (Banks) that continue to operate6 (s e Table 1, Panel B for list of MBS and 
Banks).  
This study covers a period of 21 years between 1987 and 2007. This period has been 
chosen for two reasons. First, Haynes and Thompson (1999, p. 844) notes that ‘since 
1987, the UK building societies have been in direct competition with for-profit rivals 
and have had the option of demutualizing to become commercial banks’. Second, the 
first demutualization took place in 1989 and at least two years of data is needed to 
compare pre- and post-demutualization performance (Esty, 1997b). Thus, the study 
period covers two years before the first demutualization of a building society in 1989 
and ends when the financial crisis began in 2007. This was just before the run on the 
Northern Rock Bank, a DBS, and partial nationalisation of Bradford and Bingley. Most 
of the financial data is acquired from ‘thedata ltd7, a commercial data provider 
company.  
Variables were chosen for the study which are considered as the main 
reasons/determinants for demutualization by DBSs in the UK in their transfer 
documents and elsewhere in the conversion from of mutual to stock-form of 
                                                 
5 Since mid-1980s, competition increased between the building societies; and banks also entered into the 
mortgage market. This led to a wave of mergers among building societies and the concentration of their 
assets. In 2007-08, the ten largest building societies considered in this study (Table 1, Panel B) shared 
just over 85% of building societies’ assets and 74% of branches (BSA, key statistics, 2007/08).   
6 In the UK, it is very common to compare and report performance of only major banks. For example, 
the Bank of England regularly reports major UK banks in their Financial Stability Report. KPMG also 
reports the performance of major banks in their annual UK banks performance benchmarking report. 
KPMG reports performance of building societies in different peer groups because of the big differences 
in the size of the building societies. Matthews et al. (2007) also studied major British banks.      
7 ‘thedata ltd’ has become suppliers of software to the financial services industry and do not collect and 
provide financial data anymore.  
11 
 
organization. The reasons cited by the UK demutualized firms were: greater access to 
capital, less restrictive regulatory regime, greater freedom to compete with the banks 
and their desire for more flexibility in the operation of business to allow them to 
diversify their business beyond mainly lending for residential mortgages and relying on 
retail deposits for their funding.8 These are also considered as the determinants of 
demutualization in prior studies of US savings and loan associations (see for example, 
Masulis, 1987). Overall, the variables used in the analysis are grouped under: 
profitability, growth, operating efficiency, funding and lending, and risk exposure. 
These are discussed here and also defined in Appendix I.  
4.1  Measures of profitability  
Profitability is measured using: (a) return on assets (ROA); (b) profit growth before and 
after tax (PBT and PAT); (c) return on equity (ROE); (d) gross yield (GY); and (e) net 
interest margin (NITM). ROA is computed from total income minus total operating 
expenses divided by total assets. Profit growth is profit for the current year minus profit 
in the previous year divided by profit in the previous year. ROE is the ratio of profit 
before tax, including extraordinary expenses to total equity and reserves. GY is the ratio 
of total interest and similar income divided by interest earning assets while NITM is 
the ratio of net interest receivable divided by interest earning assets.  
4.2  Measures of growth 
While growth is important for all types of organizations, DBSs have more growth 
potential than MBSs because of their ability to raise equity capital from the market 
when they need additional capital.9  Growth is measured as: (a) asset growth (asstgro), 
                                                 
8 Discussion on restrictions imposed on building societies in their operation are discussed on p6. Please 
see Stephens (2001), Taylor (2003), Shiwakoti et al. (2008) for details of the reasons/motives for 
demutualization in the UK in detail.  
9 It may be worth noting that building societies have only limited access to capital. As a mutual society, 
their shares are not marketable and there are no outside shareholders. A common meth d of raising 
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which is computed using current year’s assets less last year’s assets divided by last 
year’s assets; (b) diversification associated with growth, measured by increases in total 
other income (TOIinc); and (c) the ratio of total other income to total income (TOITI). 
TOITI is important as the housing crisis and recession in the early 1990s forced many 
societies to diversify their operation rather than just relying on the mortgage market 
(interest income).  The Building Societies Act 1986 allowed building societies to 
diversify into non-traditional areas of business. However, the Act offered them less 
operational flexibility than that of banks which is expected to be overcome when they 
have the ability to diversify their operations after demutualization. The means by which 
different institutions increase their capital is measured by the ratio of profit transferred 
to reserves divided by total equity and reserves, excluding subordinated debt, defined 
here as capital formation (CF). After demutualization, these societies become owned 
by outside shareholders to whom they are expected to pay dividends, thereby creating 
the possibility of a deterioration in CF. Alternatively, they could increase their risk 
portfolio to increase their profit and maintain or increase their capital base. Mutual 
building societies remain owned by members and, thus, they do not pay dividends with 
all profits transferred to reserve.   
4.3  Measures of operating efficiency  
As noted earlier, one of the motivations for change in the form of ownership is to 
increase operating efficiency. This is measured by (a) the management expense ratio 
(Mgtexp), computed from total operating expenses divided by total assets, and (b) the 
                                                 
finance is by issuing permanent interest bearing shares (PIBS). In 2010, HM Treasury produced a 
discussion paper on building society capital and related issues followed by an All-Party Parliamentary 
Group inquiry for Building Societies & Financial Mutuals (July 2011). Gaining access to capital was one 
of the reasons given by demutualized societies for changing their organizatio al form. 
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cost to income ratio (costi), which is the ratio of total operating expenses divided by 
total income where cost of funding is deducted.  
4.4  Measures of risk 
The relationship between risk and the form of ownership continues to be a prominent 
concern of studies of ownership. As measures of risk the present study uses: (a) loan-
loss write-off (DWOCA); (b) yearly provision for doubtful debts (PROCA); (c) net 
worth ratio (NWrat); and (d) core capital (CC). The first two ratios indicates the risk 
exposure and quality of assets. DWOCA is debts written-off during the year divided by 
total commercial assets. Commercial assets are used rather than total assets because 
provision-for and writing-off of debts are related to commercial assets. PROCA is the 
ratio of provision for doubtful debts to commercial assets and measures the riskiness of 
assets undertaken by the firm during the year. NWrat is included in the study for 
comparison with previous studies in the US where one of the objectives in the US for 
allowing conversion of savings and loans associations was to increase net worth of the 
company (see Esty 1997b). With demutualized firms able to issue new equity capital, 
it is expected that the core capital ratio (CC) should increase after demutualization. 
Access to equity capital was one of the main reasons motivating the move from mutual 
to stock-form of ownership. Capital ratio is particularly important for financial 
institutions, with its importance increasing after the recent financial crisis. There is a 
continuing debate about how much capital financial institutions should hold to avoid 
another financial crisis. This study uses total equity and reserve divided by total assets 
instead of regulatory capital to measure the capital ratios. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) 




 4.5  Measures of funding and lending  
Lending strategy is captured by the ratio of loans for residential mortgages to total 
commercial assets (resCA). This ratio gives an indication of changes in asset 
composition. Funding strategy is captured by the ratio of the percentage of retail 
funding and deposits to total share deposits and loans (RFPSDL). This ratio indicates 
the composition of liabilities and changes in these over the period examined. Changes 
in funding strategy will have an impact on the cost of funding (costfund) which is 
captured by the ratio of cost of funding (total interest and similar charges plus fees and 
commission payable and other charges) divided by total share deposits and loans. 
Finally, we also report loan-to-deposit ratios of sample firms. 
5.  Methodology 
Our sample includes three sub-groups: ten demutualized building societies (DBS), ten 
mutual building societies (MBS), and seven banks (Banks), belonging to the same 
industry (i.e. banking) (see Table 1). Each DBS is matched with an MBS and a Bank to 
make our treatment (DBS) and control groups (MBS and Banks) more comparable and 
to minimise the potential effect of omitted variables on our results. We use ROA (our 
main performance measure variable) of each DBS in the year before demutualisation 
to match with an equivalent MBS and Bank. This approach is similar to Barber and 
Lyon (1996) and Kothari et al. (2005). We report both mean and median values of each 
sub-group’s profitability, growth, operating efficiency, risk exposure, and funding and 
lending characteristics in relevant tables but draw our conclusions based on medians.  
To determine what caused changes in the operating behaviour of DBSs, the sample 
period is divided into pre- and post-conversion (or demutualization) sub-periods, with 
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conversion year as year zero, and perform the following comparisons.10 First, we 
compare the performance of DBSs from three years before to three years after 
conversion, which is more meaningful than just comparing the year-on-year 
performance of the DBS sample. Next, we compare the performance of DBS with those 
of MBS and Banks in both the pre- and post-conversion sub-periods. For this a three-
year window is used for pre-conversion period and three and five year windows for 
post-conversion period. This helps in assessing the impact of changing status on the 
operating behaviour of DBS, MBS and Banks. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) 
test is used to examine if different variables (under each category) for DBS are 
significantly different from those for mutuals (MBS) and Banks and across the two (pre 
and post) sub-periods.  
In accordance with earlier studies (for example, Esty (1997b), Valnek (1999), and 
Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011)), regression analysis is performed to determine which 
specific form of ownership perform better, using both profitability (ROA - return on 
assets) and efficiency (costi - cost to income ratio) measures as the dependent variables. 
Following prior studies, ROA is used to measure profitability (see for example, Esty 
(1997b)) and costi ratio to measure efficiency (see Mesa et al. (2014)). Financial 
institutions also regularly report cost to income ratio (costi) in their financial highlight 
in the annual reports and accounts. Consistent with Esty (1997b) and Valnek (1999), 
the following model is used: 
                                                 
10 The pre- and post-conversion years are different for different firms because DBSs demutualized in 
different years. Please refer to Table 1 for the year of demutualization and list of DBSs. 
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ROAit  or costiit = 1DBSdum + 2 Bankdum + く1 Prpodum + く2 Lntait + く3 TOITI it + 
く4 resCAit + く5 RFPSDLit + く6 Prpodum*DBSdum + く7 Prpodum*Bankdum +         
く8 Prpodum*Lntait + く9 Prpodum*TOITIit + く10 Prpodum*resCAit +                       
く11 Prpodum*RFPSDLit + t Year Dummiest + く0 +it   
Here, in each Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) regression, ROA is the return on 
assets, costi is the ratio of total operating expenses to total income minus cost of 
funding, and i and t represent sample firm and year. To differentiate among the three 
types of firms in our sample, we cluster the data around DBS, MBS and Banks and use 
two dummies, DBSdum and Bankdum. DBSdum takes value of one for demutualized 
firms (DBS) and zero for MBS and Banks over the full sample period. Bankdum takes 
the value of one for banks and zero for DBS and MBS. Prpodum is also a dummy 
variable representing pre- (a value of zero) and post- (a value of one) demutualization 
period. The natural log of total assets (lnta) is included in the model to control for size 
(Esty 1997b) due to the differences in the sizes (total assets) of DBS, MBS and Banks. 
For example, during the sample period average total assets of sample DBS, MBS, and 
Banks are £58 billion, £12 billion, and £300 billion, respectively.11 To control for 
diversification, TOITI is included in the model. Given the differences in the product-
mix of DBS, MBS, and Banks, their relevant lending (resCA) and funding (RFPSDL) 
characteristics (representing their business models) are included in the regression. All 
the independent variables are interacted with Prpodum to control for cross-section 
heterogeneity and to test whether the relevant type of firm/characteristics affect 
performance (profitability or efficiency as the case may be) in the post-demutualization 
                                                 
11 All six demutualized firms, which floated on London Stock Exchange wer in FTSE 100 constituents 
at the time of their demise. Out of these six, Abbey National, Alliance & Leicester, Halifax and Woolwich 
became the constituents of FTSE 100 at the time of flotation and Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley 
joined FTSE 100 in 2001 and 2002, respectively. 
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period. In addition, Prpodum is used to interact with each group dummy to assess 
whether the performance/efficiency improve in the post conversion period. The model 
also includes year dummies to control for cyclical/time effects but for brevity their 
coefficients (t) are not reported. 1-2 are coefficients of group dummies, 1-11 represent 
coefficients of relevant variables for each firm i, 0 is the intercept and it is the error 
term.  
6. Results and discussion 
6.1  Univariate results 
Descriptive statistics of different variables for all three groups of firms over the full 
sample period are presented in Table 2. It shows that DBS have higher ROA and Banks 
have higher ROE. MBS exposure to different risk measures is lower than those for DBS 
and Banks. Banks have the lowest rate of capital formation and have both higher 
management expenses and cost to income ratios. MBS has higher net worth and core 
capital. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Lending (resCA) and funding (RFPSDL) measures show that there are differences in 
product-mix and business structures across the three forms of businesse . The Table 
shows that the lending model of both DBS and MBS are similar, lending primarily for 
residential mortgages (more than 90 %). This ratio for Banks is only about 25 %. As 
expected, Banks are less reliant on retail funding and are more diversified compared to 
both DBS and MBS. For example, approximately 26 % of Banks’ i come is generated 
from non-interest income, a finding which is similar to that of Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2010) for an international sample of commercial banks. This percentage for 
DBS and MBS is much lower at about 10 and 8, respectively. DBS also has the highest 
average cost of funding of about 7 %. The business model adopted by DBS appears 
18 
 
more risky than that adopted by Banks and MBS. Demutualized societies became more 
fragile by increasing their reliance on more volatile non-retail funds. Thus, these results 
clearly show that in many aspects demutualized societies look different from mutual 
building societies and that they increasingly look similar to banks in their operating 
behaviour. However, especially large standard deviations in funding, lending, and 
capital formation measures suggest differences within the DBS group. 
6.2   DBS before and after conversion 
Table 3 shows the operating behaviour of DBS in the pre- (three years before) and post- 
(three years after) conversion period. The WMW test shows that most of the variables 
used to compare the changes in operating behaviour before and after demutualization 
of DBS are not significantly different from each other with a few exceptions. For 
example, ROE and total other income to total income (TOITI) ratio show significant 
increases coupled with significant decreases in net interest margin, debt write-offs, 
capital formation, and net worth ratio. However, it is not surprising to observe a 
significantly higher ROE in the post demutualization period, that is late- 1990s 
onwards, as stock form of companies are under pressure to meet expectations of 
shareholder returns. A degree of caution is necessary while interpreting decreases in net 
interest margin and debt write-offs for in the early 1990s interest rates were very high 
in the UK and there was a crisis in the housing market. These economic conditions, 
leading to higher interest margins and higher written-offs in the pre-conversion period, 
started to ease off in the mid-1990s. Additionally, significant changes can be seen in 
the business model. For example, DBS are relying less on retail funds and deposits and 
also lending less in residential mortgages after demutualization. That said, the 
magnitude of the change in funding model is more vivid than in the lending model, 
although this change has little effect on cost of funding of DBS.  
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6.3   DBS vs. MBS and Banks, pre-conversion (the pre-demutualization period) 
Table 4, Panel A (columns 8 and 9) shows some significant differences in the operating 
behaviour between DBS and MBS and between DBS and Banks in the pre-conversion 
period.12 It shows that converted societies (DBS) are more diversified compared to the 
societies which remain mutual (MBS). For example, the median of total other income 
to total income (TOITI) for DBS is 7.96 and for MBS is 6.02 and the difference is 
significant at the 1% level. Despite most of MBSs being smaller when compared to 
DBS, no significant differences can be seen in their lending (resCA) strategy with both 
groups lending more than 93% in residential mortgages. However, their funding 
strategy (RFPSDL) appears significantly different, where MBS relies more (79%) on 
retail funds and deposits than the DBS firms (75%).  
Interestingly, building societies which remain mutual were exposed to higher risk and 
made more provisions for bad and doubtful debts (PROCA), although this difference 
was insignificant. It is worth noting here that between 1988 and 1991 mortgage arrears 
and repossessions13 increased significantly in the UK, coinciding with a period of 
recession14 when risk exposure increased dramatically for both mutual and 
demutualized societies. This is consistent with, for example, Wilson et al. (2010, p. 
163) who suggest that ‘provisioning for loan-losses varies with the business cycle’. 
Both provision and debt written-off ratios clearly show that MBS are affected more 
from this crisis. This is not surprising as Murphy and Salandro (1997, p. 19) in the US 
                                                 
12 We only report some of the main results here. Please refer to Appendix II for full set of results for all 
variables/measures during the three years pre-conversion (Panel A), and three (Panel B) and five years 
(Panel C) post-conversion periods.  
13 See Bramley, G. (1994) for details of the housing crisis in the UK in the early 1990s.  
14 See Pain, D. (2003) for factors affecting provision for loan losses of the major UK banks, including 
demutualized building societies.   
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also find that ‘cyclical decline in property values resulted in a decline in the credit 
quality of loan portfolios with a substantially greater impact on those savings banks that 
converted from mutual to stock status’. No differences are found in the efficiency 
measured by management expense. In addition, most of the measures reported in Table 
4 (Panel A) and Appendix II (Panel A) are broadly similar, suggesting that no major 
differences are present between DBS and MBS in the pre-conversion period.  
The comparison between DBS and Banks (column 9) shows they are very different in 
most of the characteristics other than the growth variables.15 For example, DBS are 
investing largely in residential properties and relying more on retail deposits. However, 
Banks are more diversified and have significantly higher ROE and the lowest cost of 
funding amongst the three groups. Overall, this comparison and the results in column 
10 (MBS vs Banks) highlight that the operating behaviour of DBS and MBS is quite 
different from that of the Banks.  
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
6.4   DBS vs. MBS and Banks, post-conversion (the post-demutualization period) 
Table 4, (Panel B) column 8 (DBS vs. MBS) and column 9 (DBS vs. Banks) reports 
the operating behaviour over three years after demutualization. It shows that in this 
short period after conversion, the operating behaviour of DBSsignificantly widened as 
compared to that of MBS across most of the measures. For example, median ROE of
DBS (26.02) almost doubled that of MBS (13.63), which could be explained by the 
stock form of organization having pressure from the shareholders to meet shareholder 
return expectations. As expected, net interest margin also widened for DBS as 
compared to that for their MBS counterparts, possibly due to the abolition of 
                                                 
15 Please refer to Appendix II (Panel A) for full set of results during the thre  p e-conversion years. 
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preferential interest rate given to members compared to standard rate offered by the 
banks16. This is consistent with Heffernan (2005) for the period 1995-2001 where she 
also reports the highest interest margins on most of the products offered by 
demutualized societies compared to mutual societies.  
Results show that DBS are also taking significantly higher risk (PROCA) compared to 
MBS. This is in complete contrast to their behaviour in the pre-conversion period, 
indicating that the stock-form (demutualisation) of ownership leads to taking higher 
risks. This is consistent with Esty (1997b, p.25) where he notes that ‘conversions from 
mutual to stock ownership are associated with increased investment in risky assets ...’. 
Pain (2003) also reports that changes in the composition of loan portfolio will impact 
the banks’ loan-loss provisions. He further reports that higher lending to riskier sectors 
generally increases loan-loss provisions. Investigating the UK unit trusts, Shinozawa 
(2007) also finds that the mutual firms are more risk-averse than the stock-form of 
ownership and suggests that risk exposure differs between the two different 
organizational groups. Similarly, Hoggarth and Pain (2002, p. 116) consider that 
‘provisions are typically one of the first quantitative indicators of a deterioration in the 
loan quality and, at the same time, a key contributor to fluctuations in bank earnings 
and capital’. Wilson et al. (2010) also provide a similar explanation and suggest that 
‘loan-loss provisions are directly linked to a financial institution’s current loan 
portfolio’. Our results also show that DBS are accumulating bad quality assets 
(DWOCA) in their portfolio within this short period after demutualization. This is 
further supported by significant changes in their lending policy measured by lending 
for residential properties (resCA) during this period. MBS are consistently lending over 
                                                 
16 We are grateful to reviewers for providing these possible explanations. 
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95% of their loans in residential mortgages but this percentage for DBS falls to 91% 
three years after their demutualization.   
Consistent with the changes in lending, stark changes can be seen in the funding 
strategy. The funding model of DBS and MBS is significantly different from the period 
when both groups were mutual societies, with DBS relying more on wholesale funding. 
Reliance on retail funding (median RFPSDL) by demutualized societies in this post-
conversion period is 69%, substantially down from about 75% before conversion, 
which is very similar to that for Banks (at about 68%). Speight and Parkinson (2003) 
argue that the increased use of wholesale funding in recent years is a result of the rapid 
growth in customer lending rather than growth in their customer deposits. In addition, 
they argue that UK households are borrowing more from banks and building societies 
resulting in a slow increase in retail deposits and an increased use of wholesale markets 
to fund such growth. Some other possible reasons for increased use of wholesale 
funding are a fall in the savings rate and the removal of quantitative limits on mortgage 
and other consumer borrowing.17 These results are also consistent with DBS and MBS 
increasing their loan-to-deposit ratios (LntoDep) during this period.  
Capital formation (CF) deteriorated in this period (See Appendix II , Panel B) for both 
DBS and MBS, with MBS maintaining slightly higher values for this measure. The 
recent financial crisis has further emphasised the importance of higher capital for banks 
and financial institutions to minimise the impact of losses. Findings from this study 
show that MBS have a consistently higher capital base (CC) than both DBS and Banks. 
Ayadi et al. (2010) also find consistently higher capital levels for cooperative banks 
compared to commercial banks in Germany and argue that this is one of the reasons 
                                                 
17 We are grateful to reviewers for providing these possible explanations. 
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why most of the cooperative banks were less affected by the financial crisis. DBS also 
appear more diversified (TOITI) than MBS, with Banks being more diversified than 
the other two groups. This is consistent with prior studies (see, for example, Hadaway 
and Hadaway (1981), Mester (1993), and Valnek (1999)). Similarly, management-
expense ratio, one of the measures of efficiency, significantly widened between DBS 
and MBS in this post-conversion period. This might be the result of higher 
remuneration paid to DBS directors after the conversion. Examining the causes of the 
conversion of UK building societies, Shiwakoti et al. (2004) report large increases in 
remuneration of chief executives and directors and conclude that the potential for 
directors to enhance their remuneration was one of the major driving factors behind the 
conversion of building societies. In US savings and loan conversion, Masulis (1987) 
also reported large wealth gains to management after conversion. 
The operating behaviour of Banks (Table 4 Panel B, columns 9 and 10) show that they 
are taking more risks than both the other groups (DBS and MBS). However, both the 
funding and lending models of Banks seem consistent with those of DBS. Overall, the 
results show that during the three years after conversion, the behaviour of DBS has 
started to diverge from MBS while it has started to converge with Banks.18,19  
We also show changes in key variables over a longer period (−3 to +10 years) between 
DBS and MBS in Figure 1, DBS and Banks in Figure 2, and MBS and Banks in Figure 
3. Figure 1 clearly shows that DBS and MBS have been on diverging paths in their 
operation after the demutualization.  
                                                 
18 Please refer to Appendix II, Panel B for full set of results over three-year post-conversion period. 
19 When the examining window is extended to a five-year post-conversion period (as reported in 
Appendix II , Panel C), the differences in the operating behaviour of DBS widen further in comparison 
with MBS. Other results are similar to those reported for the three-year post-conversion window. 
However, the magnitude of differences increased over this period. 
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The above discussion indicates that there are clear differences in the business model of 
DBS. For example, Banks are offering just over 22% of their lending to residential 
mortgages (resCA) but this figure is about 89% for DBS. Surprisingly, DBS are 
indifferent on their funding model (RFPSDL) with the Banks, Banks appear 
significantly more diversified (TOITI) than DBS. In addition, DBS became the least 
capitalised group within the five years after demutualization (see Appendix II , Panel 
C). Overall, results show that Banks are better in adopting a business model that suits 
them and are better capitalised than those of their DBS counterparts. These results show 
that DBS are increasingly looking similar to banks and, thus, organizational form could 
be seen to affect business strategies. For example, DBS changed their business model 
(i.e. their funding and lending strategies) and increasingly started to behave more like 
retail banks after demutualization. Similarly, DBS are increasingly and significantly 
becoming more diversified than MBS but the extent of this diversification is moderate 
compared to Banks.  
Overall, it seems that the funding strategy played a significant role in the demise of 
demutualized societies, particularly around the time of the financial crisis when most 
of DBS could not survive as independent firms. As discussed above, the shift in 
operating behaviour between DBS and MBS is quite remarkable even over a shorter 
post-conversion period. Although these results provide support to the proposition that 
DBS began to behave differently from that of MBS soon after demutualization, further 
tests performed are reported in the next sub-section.20  
                                                 
20 We also match DBS with MBS using cost to income (costi) ratio in the year before d mutualization 
and compare the performance of these two groups across all characteristics (result not reported for 
brevity) in both pre- and post-demutualization periods. However the esults largely remain qualitatively 
similar to ROA-based matching, as reported in sub-sections 6.2 and 6.3. 
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6.5  Performance and form of ownership 
Extant empirical literature on the impact of form of ownership on firm performance 
shows mixed results. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest 
that mutual organizations, which are owned by members and have diffused ownership, 
result in weak control by owners over management. This leads to a lack of capital 
market discipline resulting in fewer incentives to improve efficiency. This is confirmed 
by Chaddad and Cook (2004) for the US demutualization of savings and loan and 
insurance industries. They report that demutualization generally enhances efficiency. 
McNamara and Rhee (1992, p. 236) also support enhanced efficiency ‘as the 
justification and result of demutualization’. Others (see, for example, Mester 1993), 
however, suggest that mutual firms are more efficient in their operations. Casu and 
Girardone (2009) also find mutual firms being more efficient in Europe. In the UK, 
Valnek (1999, p. 936) reports superior performance of mutual building societies over 
retail banks and suggests that ‘the benefits of mutual organizations have outweighed 
the benefits of stock organizations’.  
Table 5 reports regression results. In the LDSV (least square dummy variable) 
regression model, both profitability and efficiency measures are used as dependent 
variables. Profitability is represented by return on assets (ROA) and efficiency by cost 
to income (costi) ratio. We begin analysis with ROA as an indicator variable for form 
of ownership (DBSdum, value of 1 for DBS and 0 for MBS and Banks), Bankdum 
(value of 1 for Banks and 0 for DBS and MBS); a dummy variable for pre- (value of 0) 
and post- (value of 1) conversion period (Prpodum), and a number of explanatory and 
control variables as discussed in Section 4. In the analysis, group dummies and all 
independent variables are interacted with Prpodum to model cross-sectional 
heterogeneity and year dummies are included to control the impact of time.  
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Regression with ROA as dependent variable shows that the demutualization dummy 
(DBSdum) is positive but insignificant, suggesting that DBS performance is indifferent 
from MBS and Banks over the full sample period. In addition, pre-post dummy 
(Prpodum) is also positive and insignificant. However, the interaction of DBSdum with 
Prpodum is positive and significant, suggesting that DBS experience superior 
performance in the post-conversion period. Untabulated results show that all year 
dummies after 1991 are negative and significant (except 1991), indicating deteriorating 
performance over time. Results for independent and control variables show that only 
the variable for lending (resCA) is positively and significantly contributing to 
profitability. The other three control and independent variables are negative but only 
funding variable (RFPSDL) has negative and significant impact on performance. 
Overall, the above result confirms that DBS have higher ROA but once controlled for 
conversion and time effects, their ROA decreases suggesting that demutualization is 
not rewarding and performance deteriorates after conversion. The overall impact of size 
on ROA is negative and both negative and significant in the post-conversion period 
based on its interaction with Prpodum. This is not surprising as Esty (1997b) and Carhill 
and Hasan (1997) also document negative and significant coefficient of size variable in 
their studies of US savings and loan association, which are similar in nature to building 
societies in the UK. The interaction of lending (resCA) and funding policies (RFPSDL) 
with Prpodum also show significant changes. For example, lending to residential 
mortgage has a marginally negative impact whereas the use of wholesale funds has a 
significant positive impact on profitability in the post-conversion period. Results also 
show no significant changes in the non-interest income in the post-conversion period. 
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The ROA-regression model has an adjusted R-squared of 68%, which is much higher 
than those reported in earlier studies (see Esty (1997b), Shinozawa (2007)).  
In the second regression (columns 5 to 7), profitability variable (ROA) is replaced with 
efficiency variable, the cost to income (costi) ratio.  Referring to previous literature, 
Halkos and Salamouris (2004) report that simple cost to income ratio estimates the 
efficiency of banks. The results of this study show that Prpodum is negative but 
insignificant suggesting no significant changes in efficiency after conversion. 
Similarly, DBSdum is also negative and insignificant. The coefficients on interaction 
of Prpodum with different variables are statistically insignificant with the exception of 
that of the interaction with TOITI (a proxy for diversification). It shows a negative and 
significant relation between diversification and costi in the post-conversion period, 
implying that diversification increases the cost to the firms. This is consistent with the 
extant literature. For example, studying the effects of focus versus diversification on 
bank performance on Chinese banks, Berger et al. (2010) report that diversification is 
associated with higher costs. Stiroh (2004) also found little diversification benefit from 
shifting to non-interest income.  In the earlier period comparing the UK commercial 
banks and building societies, Vittas (1991) also concluded that high operating ratios of 
banks is largely associated with their business mix, the diversification of their business.  
In contrast to some earlier studies (see for example, Halkos and Salamouris, (2004), 
Mesa et al. (2014)), our results show that size has no impact on efficiency of banks. For 
example, Halkos and Salamouris (2004) find that larger asset size is associated with 
improved efficiency.  However, Mesa et al. (2014) report no relation between efficiency 
and size for larger banks (with assets more than $25 billion).  The results show that an 
increase in wholesale funding (RFPSDL) has significant and negative impact on the 
efficiency of our sample firms. We also find that overall income diversification (TOITI) 
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led to an increase in the cost to income ratio, though it is argued that non-interest income 
is risky and more highly volatile than interest income. In addition, the study has found 
negative and only a marginally significant relation between asset diversification 
(resCA) and efficiency. Untabulated results show that cost to income ratio significantly 
increased in early 1990s around the housing crisis (ERM crisis) while no significant 
changes were observed in other years. Overall, the above results confirm that DBS did 
not achieve the main objective of demutualisation, that is, significant improvement in 
efficiency after the change to the stock-form of ownership.  
7. Conclusion 
The main objective of this study is to investigate the possible causes of the demise of 
demutualized building societies (DBS) in the UK. The study performed thorough 
analysis of the business strategy, ownership, and performance of UK financial 
institutions comprising the population of demutualized building societies and asample 
of seven major retail banks (Banks), and the ten largest building societies which remain 
mutual (MBS). To establish the causes of disappearance of DBS, several tests were 
performed. First, we compare pre- and post-conversion behaviour of DBS.  To explore 
this further, the performance and efficiency of DBS with MBS and Banks was 
compared in the pre- (−3 to −1 years period) and post-demutualization periods (+1 to 
+3 years and +1 to +5 years).  It is also possible that a change in the operating behaviour 
may have had little to do with changes in the organizational form and more to do with 
changes in the market. To overcome this problem, control for time period effects is 
incorporated in the regression model. While performance and operating behaviour are 
examined directly across pre-and-post conversion periods of DBS, the results show 
improvement only in ROE along with changes in their business models. Additionally, 
DBS experienced a deteriorating capital base and capital formation.  
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The behaviour of all DBS, MBS and Banks was compared in the pre- and post-
conversion periods to find the origin of differences. The results show significant 
differences in their operating behaviour in the post-conversion period. In addition, 
demutualized building societies were found to substantially change both their funding 
and lending strategies (business model) with funding strategy changes being more 
dramatic than those associated with lending strategy. DBS are less reliant on retail funds 
and deposits after conversion than retail banks but still DBS are largely lending for 
residential properties. Their lending strategy is more risky than those of MBS and 
Banks. For example, loan to deposit ratio just before the financial crisis was 400 % for 
demutualized societies, 126 % for mutual building societies and 115 % for banks.21 
This ratio was just over 850 % for Northern Rock in the year of demise and 321% in 
2006, which became a symbol of financial crisis in the UK. Converting societies did 
not experience any significant improvement in their efficiency after demutualization.  
The MBS sample also appear better capitalised compared to the DBS sample when both 
were mutual, but in the post-conversion period the capital formation for DBS 
deteriorate and become significantly lower than that for MBS. Most noticeable changes 
are in their risk exposure across both risk measures. Such risk is not reflected in the 
profitability performance of DBS. Their diminished reliance on more expensive retail 
funds and deposits has no impact on their cost of funding. In fact, cost of funding 
remains higher for DBS as compared to MBS both in pre- and post-conversion periods. 
These results clearly show that DBS are increasingly looking different from MBS and 
more similar to Banks. However, Banks appear better capitalised than DBS. Although 
Banks have higher risk exposure than DBS, Banks are also compensated more for such 
risks than are DBS. The business model of Banks is also different from that of DBS and 
                                                 
21 Loan-to-deposit ratios of sample firms are reported in Tables 2-4.  
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their cost of capital is significantly lower than that for DBS. These results show changes 
in the business model of DBS which might have contributed to the demise of a once 
successful financial institution in the UK.  
Regression results further confirm indifferent performance of DBS after conversion. 
Indicator variables for pre-post dummy and DBS dummy are positive but insignificant. 
Results also confirm that DBS have changed their business model after 
demutualization. Once interacted, proxies for funding and lending variables changed 
the sign and results are significant. Regression with efficiency variable (cost to income 
ratio) shows no significant changes in efficiency after demutualization. Overall, a 
deteriorating capital base and problematic capital formation during the post-
demutualization period, the inability to reduce the cost of funding and failure to get 
funding from the market during the financial crisis have contributed to the demise of 
demutualized societies.  
The study finds a weak relationship between the form of ownership and performance 
of the firm. The results suggest that demutualization does not produce success that 
could have been achieved in the mutual form of ownership and this might have 
contributed to a reluctance for further demutualizations. Another possible reason might 
have ben the preventive measures taken by most of the remaining building societies 
by establishing a charitable foundation where new members are required to surrender 
their rights to windfall gains to the charitable foundation in the case of conversion to a 
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Table 1: List of demutualized building societies, sample mutual building societies, and 
banks 








Total assets of 





Total assets of all 
building societies 










1989 *Abbey National 315,36.9 193,332.5 16.31% 
1995 Cheltenham and 
Gloucester 
19,403.4 300,606.4 6.45% 
1996 National and 
Provincial 
14,133.0 301,306.3 4.69% 


















1999 Birmingham and 
Midshires 
82,28.2 162,405.0 5.07% 
2000 *Bradford and 
Bingley 
23,885.2 168,783.4 14.15% 
DBS shown with an * were floated on the London Stock Exchange and the remaining DBS were 
taken over by other demutualized building societies or retail banks.  
Panel B: Names of matched mutual building societies (MBS) and banks 
Mutual building societies (MBS) Banks 
Britannia Nationwide Bank of Scotland  Standard Chartered Bank 
Chelsea Portman Barclays Bank National Westminster Bank 
Coventry Skipton Lloyds TSB Bank The Royal Bank of 
Scotland 
Derbyshire West Bromwich HSBC Bank  
Leeds Yorkshire   
Panel A of the table provides names of the building societies which demutualized (DBS) and the 
year of their demutualization. It also reports total assets of the demutualized building society and 
of all building societies at the start of the year in which they demutualize. The last column reports 
the percentage of total assets which demutualize in that particular year. Panel B reports the names 
of the next ten largest building societies which maintained their mutualized form (MBS) and the 




Table 2: Descriptive statistics of all variables based on firm year observations, 1987 to 2007 
Group DBS MBS Banks 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Obs. 
Measures of Profitability: 
ROA 7.301 6.420 2.592 156 6.563 5.710 2.470 210 5.542 5.110 2.761 155 
PBTinc 11.847 13.510 36.833 146 12.447 11.160 38.011 200 19.799 11.830 56.250 138 
PATinc 13.863 13.260 47.918 146 13.263 11.500 38.705 200 21.162 15.810 50.074 138 
ROE 23.523 24.750 7.306 156 15.949 14.250 6.993 209 24.270 23.778 10.742 154 
GY 8.217 7.360 2.685 156 7.388 6.520 2.718 210 6.895 6.830 2.386 154 
NITM 3.340 3.270 1.680 156 2.570 2.270 1.626 210 2.519 2.579 0.712 158 
Measures of growth: 
asstgro 14.900 12.960 12.878 146 13.802 12.975 13.097 200 15.888 9.723 34.256 152 
TOIinc 20.087 14.800 40.791 146 14.311 10.925 26.180 200 18.708 14.230 38.025 138 
TOITI 9.750 7.350 7.077 156 7.555 5.760 7.324 209 25.827 25.442 9.889 154 
CF 10.702 11.060 6.817 155 10.432 9.720 4.239 209 6.986 7.839 6.068 158 
Measures of operating efficiency: 
Mgtexp 1.423 1.280 0.661 156 1.201 1.010 0.637 210 2.442 2.460 0.716 134 
Costi 56.877 54.920 15.604 156 58.399 56.580 11.764 210 64.667 64.400 8.513 129 
Measures of risk: 
DWOCA 0.221 0.150 0.260 156 0.164 0.030 0.322 210 0.217 0.039 0.264 160 
PROCA 0.246 0.160 0.291 156 0.186 0.050 0.356 210 0.277 0.245 0.286 158 
NWrat 4.616 4.620 0.938 156 5.354 5.330 0.784 210 4.906 4.650 1.198 160 
CC 4.405 4.450 0.971 156 5.050 5.090 0.908 210 4.789 4.570 1.191 160 
Measures of funding and lending:  
resCA 90.594 94.570 9.860 156 95.371 97.180 4.736 210 24.568 22.010 12.517 160 
RFPSDL 69.203 74.130 14.825 156 76.872 77.980 9.924 210 65.762 67.416 11.760 160 
Costfund 6.787 5.750 2.573 155 6.216 5.320 2.424 210 4.561 4.357 2.107 153 
LntoDep 128.80 115.34 65.16 156 111.501 109.580 13.378 209 101.205 95.810 22.987 160 
This table provides some descriptive statistics of the variables used in the paper. DBS represents demutualized building societies, MBS mutualized building 
societies and Banks, commercial banks. Variables shown in table are defined in Appendix I. 
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Table 3: Pre- and post-demutualization mean and median values for different variables for DBS 
sample, in event time 
Demutualised Building Societies (DBS) Sample 
















Measures of Profitability: 
ROA 6.563 6.401 6.350 5.960 0.886 
PBTinc 18.216 10.412 12.785 7.395 1.395 
PATinc 16.776 18.978 11.430 10.630 0.203 
ROE 22.307 25.576 22.410 26.020 -2.779 a 
GY 7.396 7.300 7.180 6.705 0.974 
NITM 3.407 2.508 3.280 2.000 3.173 a 
Measures of growth: 
asstgro 10.854 11.927 9.135 12.065 -1.170 
TOIinc 12.194 16.863 6.885 16.460 -1.193 
TOITI 9.480 12.448 7.960 11.395 -1.970 b 
CF 12.439 8.102 12.445 9.300 3.838 a 
Measures of operating efficiency: 
Mgtexp 1.425 1.398 1.350 1.345 0.241 
costi 53.966 51.879 56.610 47.955 1.204 
Measures of risk: 
DWOCA 0.348 0.108 0.220 0.090 3.373 a 
PROCA 0.243 0.154 0.170 0.110 1.556 
NWrat 5.419 4.772 5.420 4.945 2.057 b 
CC 4.891 4.963 4.890 4.960 0.109 
Measures of funding and lending: 
resCA 93.434 90.274 93.570 91.195 1.904 b 
RFPSDL 75.054 68.742 74.790 69.000 3.206 a 
Costfund 5.827 5.818 5.640 5.225 0.733 
LntoDep 115.762 122.069 114.430 120.470 -1.598 
The table reports mean and median values of different variables, in event time, for three years before 
(−3 to −1) and three years after (+1 to +3 as) demutualization for the demutualized building soc eties 
(DBS) sample. The year of demutualization (year 0) is as reported in Table 1 and the variables are as 
defined in Table 2 (or Appendix I). It also reports z-stat for equality of medians using Wilcoxon-Mann-




Table 4: Mean and median values of selected variables for DBS, ROA matched MBS, and ROA matched Banks, in event time 
Panel A: DBS vs MBS vs Banks in the pre-demutualisation period (−3 to −1 years relative to event year 0) 
Panel B: DBS vs MBS vs Banks in the post-demutualisation period (+1 to +3 years relative to event year 0) 
ROA 6.401 5.963 5.721 5.960 5.620 5.163 1.107 1.871 c 1.342 
ROE 25.576 13.592 26.195 26.020 13.630 28.470 5.431 a -0.700 -4.564 a 
NITM 2.508 1.687 2.708 2.000 1.330 2.715 3.163 a -2.615 a -4.716 a 
TOITI 12.448 8.974 24.593 11.395 6.670 25.010 2.556 a -4.815 a -5.868 a 
Mgtexp 1.398 1.104 2.434 1.345 0.995 2.450 1.917 b -4.751 a -6.079 a 
PROCA 0.154 0.064 0.357 0.110 0.080 0.480 2.079 b -1.664 c -3.269 a 
CC 4.963 5.361 4.983 4.960 5.330 4.720 -2.045 b 0.460 2.411 b 
resCA 90.274 95.306 24.997 91.195 97.655 22.092 -2.790 a 5.713 a 6.596 a 
RFPSDL 68.742 75.763 66.046 69.000 76.965 67.822 -2.023 b 0.569 3.063 a 
LntoDep 122.069 112.964 105.389 120.470 111.040 95.810 1.725 c 3.611 a 2.441 a 
The table reports mean and median values of selected variables (see Appendix I) for DBS, MBS, and Banks during the three pre- (Panel A) and three 
post- (Panel B) demutualization years. It also reports Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) z-stat for equality in medians for DBS vs MBS, DBS vs Banks, 
and for MBS vs Banks. Superscripts a, b, and c represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The number in parenthesis shows column number. 
Variable Mean Median WMW z-stat 
Column (1) DBS  (2) MBS (3) Bank  (4) DBS  (5) MBS  (6) Bank  (7) DBS-MBS (8) DBS-Banks (9) MBS-Banks (10) 
ROA 6.563 6.136 5.945 6.350 5.820 5.710 1.561 2.566 a 1.008 
ROE 22.307 17.015 31.398 22.410 16.100 29.569 3.717 a -4.403 a -5.960 a 
NITM 3.407 3.036 2.877 3.280 3.040 2.687 1.734 c 2.386 b 0.902 
TOITI 9.480 6.804 24.024 7.960 6.020 25.020 2.535 a -5.928 a -6.354 a 
Mgtexp 1.425 1.327 2.746 1.350 1.360 2.684 0.506 -5.182 a -6.184 a 
PROCA 0.243 0.332 0.278 0.170 0.260 0.330 -1.081 -0.402 0.697 
CC 4.891 5.457 4.394 4.890 5.490 4.197 -1.983 b 3.157 a 3.714 a 
resCA 93.434 94.929 25.498 93.570 95.180 20.363 -1.112 6.420 a 6.420 a 
RFPSDL 75.054 80.697 68.639 74.790 78.870 70.535 -3.227 a 3.714 a 5.862 a 
LntoDep 115.762 106.382 99.196 114.430 107.740 97.281 3.375 a 4.591 a 2.861 a 
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Figures 1 to 3: Graph of median values of selected variables (as defined in Appendix-I) for DBS, 






















































































Table 5: Least square dummy variable (LSDV) regression results 
ROAit  or costiit = 1DBSdum + 2 Bankdum + く1 Prpodum + く2 Lntait + く3 TOITI it +      
く4 resCAit + く5 RFPSDLit + く6 Prpodum*DBSdum + く7 Prpodum*Bankdum 
+ く8 Prpodum*Lntait + く9 Prpodum*TOITIit + く10 Prpodum*resCAit +                    
く11 Prpodum*RFPSDLit + t Year Dummiest + く0 +it   
  ROA Costi 
Column  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 Coeff. C.R.S.E p-value Coeff. C.R.S.E p-value 
Prpodum 3.75 2.29 0.11 -4.54 19.88 0.82 
DBSdum 1.46 1.64 0.38 -5.37 14.15 0.71 
Bankdum 3.25 2.94 0.28 -30.78 19.41 0.12 
Lnta -0.12 0.16 0.47 0.10 1.30 0.94 
TOITI -0.03 0.03 0.23 1.06 0.17 0.00 
resCA 0.03 0.02 0.09 -0.23 0.14 0.10 
RFPSDL -0.03 0.02 0.05 -0.27 0.13 0.05 
Prpodum*DBSdum 5.22 2.11 0.02 -8.00 16.40 0.63 
Prpodum*Bankdum 2.98 3.18 0.36 17.80 20.96 0.40 
Prpodum*Lnta -0.49 0.20 0.02 0.01 1.56 0.99 
Prpodum*TOITI 0.04 0.02 0.15 -0.58 0.19 0.01 
Prpodum*resCA -0.03 0.02 0.09 0.16 0.14 0.27 
Prpodum*RFPSDL 0.04 0.01 0.02 -0.11 0.17 0.53 
Intercept 11.08 1.68 0.00 91.91 15.74 0.00 
Year Dummies (1988-2007) included included 
No of observations 519   519   
Adjusted R-squared 68%   32%   
This table reports coefficients, clustered robust standard errors (C.R.S.E) and p-vlues using a Least 
Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) model and controls for fixed effects across three types of firms (DBS, 
MBS, and Banks). The dependent variable in each model is either ROA or costi, where ROA is return 
on assets (measure of profitability) and costi is cost-to-income ratio (measure of operating efficiency). 
The data is clustered around DBS, MBS, and Banks for which we use two dummies: DBSdum (a 
dummy variable for demutualized firms) and Bankdum (a dummy variable for commercial banks). The 
group of firms which remain mutual (MBS) is the reference group. Prpodum is also a dummy 
representing pre- and post-demutualization periods relevant to the demutualization year 0. Lnta is 
natural log of total assets. TOITI, CC, resCA, and RFPSDL are as defined in Appendix I). All the 
variables are interacted with Prpodum to model cross-sectional heterogeneity. The models also include 




Appendix I: Definition of variables 
Variable Definition 
Return on assets 
(ROA) 
Total income minus total operating expenses divided by total 
assets. 
Profit before tax 
increase (PBTinc) 
Profit before tax for the current year minus profit before tax in the 
previous year divided by profit before tax in the previous year. 
Profit after tax 
increase (PATinc) 
Same as PBTinc but here profit after tax figure is considered. 
Return on equity 
(ROE) 
Profit before tax plus extraordinary expenses divided by total 
equity and reserves. 
Gross yield (GY) Ratio of total interest and similar income divided by interest 
earnings assets 
Net interest margin 
(NITM) 
Ratio of net interest receivable divided by interest earnings assets. 
Capital formation 
(CF) 




Similar to PBTinc but here assets are used instead of profit. 
Total other income 
increase (TOIinc) 
Similar to PBTinc but here total other income is used. 
Total other income to 
total income (TOITI) 
Ratio of total other income divided by total income. 
Management expense 
ratio (Mgtexp) 
Total operating expenses divided by total assets. 
Cost to income (costi) Ratio of total operating expenses divided by total income minus 
cost of funding. 
Debt written off 
(DWOCA) 





Ratio of the provision for bad and doubtful debts for the year 
divided by total commercial assets. 
Net worth ratio 
(NWrat) 
Total assets minus total liabilities (net worth) divided by total 
assets. 




Ratio of loan on residential mortgage to total commercial assets. 
Retail funds and 
deposits (RFPSDL) 
Ratio of retail funds and deposits to total share deposits and loan. 
Cost of funding 
(costfund) 
Ratio of total interest and similar charges plus fees and 
commission payable and other charges divided by total share 
deposits and loans. 
Loan to deposit ratio 
(LntoDep) 
Ratio of total loans to total deposits 
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Appendix II: Mean and median values of different variables for DBS, ROA matched MBS, and ROA matched Banks, in event time 
Panel A: DBS vs MBS vs Banks in the pre-demutualisation period (−3 to −1 years relative to event year 0) 
(Appendix II  continued on next page) 
 
  
Variable Mean Median WMW z-stat 
Column (1) DBS  (2) MBS (3) Bank  (4) DBS  (5) MBS  (6) Bank  (7) DBS-MBS (8) DBS-Banks (9) MBS-Banks (10) 
ROA 6.563 6.136 5.945 6.350 5.820 5.710 1.561 2.566 a 1.008 
PBTinc 18.216 21.905 39.543 12.785 19.465 24.377 -0.623 -1.087 -0.502 
PATinc 16.776 24.040 50.394 11.430 23.735 28.886 -1.163 -1.527 -0.627 
ROE 22.307 17.015 31.398 22.410 16.100 29.569 3.717 a -4.403 a -5.960 a 
GY 7.396 7.256 7.349 7.180 7.010 7.430 0.467 -0.517 -0.828 
NITM 3.407 3.036 2.877 3.280 3.040 2.687 1.734 c 2.386 b 0.902 
asstgro 10.854 7.075 9.672 9.135 7.895 7.301 0.885 0.537 -0.294 
TOIinc 12.194 12.261 10.630 6.885 -0.225 4.699 0.836 0.356 -0.648 
TOITI 9.480 6.804 24.024 7.960 6.020 25.020 2.535 a -5.928 a -6.354 a 
CF 12.439 10.811 10.727 12.445 10.850 11.946 2.059 b 0.892 -0.894 
Mgtexp 1.425 1.327 2.746 1.350 1.360 2.684 0.506 -5.182 a -6.184 a 
costi 53.966 58.441 64.744 56.610 57.090 65.052 -0.925 -3.199 a -2.520 a 
DWOCA 0.348 0.450 N/A 0.220 0.360 N/A -0.327 − − 
PROCA 0.243 0.332 0.278 0.170 0.260 0.330 -1.081 -0.402 0.697 
NWrat 5.419 5.704 4.479 5.420 5.760 4.263 -1.555 4.206 a 4.386 a 
CC 4.891 5.457 4.394 4.890 5.490 4.197 -1.983 b 3.157 a 3.714 a 
resCA 93.434 94.929 25.498 93.570 95.180 20.363 -1.112 6.420 a 6.420 a 
RFPSDL 75.054 80.697 68.639 74.790 78.870 70.535 -3.227 a 3.714 a 5.862 a 
costfund 5.827 5.752 4.977 5.640 5.410 4.890 0.490 2.911 a 2.853 a 
LntoDep 115.762 106.382 99.196 114.430 107.740 97.281 3.375 a 4.591 a 2.861 a 
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Panel B (Table 4): DBS vs MBS vs Banks in the post-demutualisation period (+1 to +3 years relative to event year 0) 
Variable Mean Median WMW z-stat 
Column (1) DBS  (2) MBS (3) Bank  (4) DBS  (5) MBS (6) Bank  (7) DBS-MBS (8) DBS-Banks (9) MBS-Banks (10) 
ROA 6.401 5.963 5.721 5.960 5.620 5.163 1.107 1.871 c 1.342 
PBTinc 10.412 14.203 28.744 7.395 9.665 13.270 -0.745 -0.974 -0.637 
PATinc 18.978 15.950 28.742 10.630 11.230 15.720 0.128 -0.481 -0.819 
ROE 25.576 13.592 26.195 26.020 13.630 28.470 5.431 a -0.700 -4.564 a 
GY 7.300 6.584 6.984 6.705 6.060 6.714 2.034 b 0.481 -1.107 
NITM 2.508 1.687 2.708 2.000 1.330 2.715 3.163 a -2.615 a -4.716 a 
asstgro 11.927 13.868 19.837 12.065 13.750 8.229 -1.214 1.029 2.199 b 
TOIinc 16.863 13.837 17.631 16.460 15.275 14.520 0.447 0.514 0.136 
TOITI 12.448 8.974 24.593 11.395 6.670 25.010 2.556 a -4.815 a -5.868 a 
CF 8.102 9.845 8.089 9.300 9.395 8.670 -1.139 -0.569 0.622 
Mgtexp 1.398 1.104 2.434 1.345 0.995 2.450 1.917 b -4.751 a -6.079 a 
Costi 51.879 58.238 62.737 47.955 60.265 62.275 -2.290 b -3.343 a -1.906 c 
DWOCA 0.108 0.097 0.328 0.090 0.065 0.360 0.661 -2.452 a -3.565 a 
PROCA 0.154 0.064 0.357 0.110 0.080 0.480 2.079 b -1.664 c -3.269 a 
NWrat 4.772 5.561 5.128 4.945 5.550 4.940 -2.801 a -0.252 2.593 a 
CC 4.963 5.361 4.983 4.960 5.330 4.720 -2.045 b 0.460 2.411 b 
resCA 90.274 95.306 24.997 91.195 97.655 22.092 -2.790 a 5.713 a 6.596 a 
RFPSDL 68.742 75.763 66.046 69.000 76.965 67.822 -2.023 b 0.569 3.063 a 
Costfund 5.818 5.590 4.818 5.225 5.115 4.720 0.405 2.057 b 2.161 a 
LntoDep 122.069 112.964 105.389 120.470 111.040 95.810 1.725 c 3.611 a 2.441 a 
(Appendix II  continued on next page) 
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Panel C (Table 4): DBS vs MBS vs Banks in the post-demutualisation period (+1 to +5 years relative to event year 0) 
Variable Mean Median WMW z-stat 
Column (1) DBS  (2) MBS (3) Bank  (4) DBS  (5) MBS (6) Bank  (7) DBS-MBS (8) DBS-Banks (9) MBS-Banks (10) 
ROA 5.835 5.487 5.317 5.585 5.325 4.790 1.016 2.068 b 1.742 c 
PBTinc 15.385 10.310 24.153 10.205 9.665 10.625 0.432 0.006 -0.491 
PATinc 27.904 11.357 25.539 12.345 9.580 10.384 1.156 0.513 -0.543 
ROE 24.959 13.346 25.152 25.020 13.185 24.478 6.823 a 0.006 -6.087 a 
GY 6.661 6.056 6.415 6.385 5.805 6.475 1.958 b 0.412 -1.173 
NITM 2.149 1.527 2.605 1.805 1.275 2.634 3.761 a -4.403 a -6.462 a 
asstgro 14.759 13.594 15.232 12.860 13.175 8.880 0.083 1.878 c 2.596 a 
TOIinc 17.914 11.366 18.182 12.315 13.410 13.457 0.552 0.663 0.121 
TOITI 13.240 9.314 26.791 12.985 6.725 28.150 3.344 a -5.930 a -7.510 a 
CF 7.347 9.521 6.956 8.440 9.245 7.492 -1.964 b 0.591 2.494 a 
Mgtexp 1.340 1.058 2.443 1.275 0.925 2.428 2.459 a -6.057 a -7.483 a 
costi 52.855 58.360 63.502 52.640 58.735 62.985 -2.443 a -4.000 a -2.558 a 
DWOCA 0.130 0.078 0.316 0.095 0.040 0.350 2.651 a -2.687 a -4.884 a 
PROCA 0.174 0.060 0.352 0.140 0.060 0.445 3.597 a -1.873 c -3.720 a 
NWrat 4.550 5.481 5.317 4.475 5.550 4.965 -4.391 a -1.795 c 1.636 c 
CC 4.609 5.215 5.146 4.450 5.235 4.725 -3.474 a -1.326 1.339 
resCA 87.202 94.991 25.836 89.020 97.655 22.092 -4.094 a 7.179 a 8.435 a 
RFPSDL 64.199 74.157 65.288 66.750 75.445 66.429 -3.927 a -0.791 3.865 a 
costfund 5.299 5.108 4.309 4.910 4.945 4.230 0.359 2.736 a 2.941 a 
LntoDep 127.395 113.776 107.017 124.910 111.040 100.442 3.437 a 4.425 a 2.765 a 
The table provides mean and median values (as defined in Appendix I) for DBS, ROA matched MBS, and ROA matched Banks during the three years before 
(Panel A), and three (Panel B) and five years (Panel C) after demutualisation in event time. DBS represents demutualized building societies, MBS mutual 
building societies and Banks commercial banks. It also reports Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) z-stat for equality in median values for DBS vs MBS, DBS 
vs Banks, and for MBS vs Banks. Superscripts a, b, and c represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The number in parenthesis shows column number. 
